C. Uday Bhaskar
FEB.19 : India’s most viable diplomatic options now would be to maintain the current posture vis-a-vis Pakistan, while simultaneously trying to prevail upon the international community to encourage Islamabad to respond to India in a positive way. Any attempt to intimidate and disparage Pakistan in public would be counter-productive.
We should accept Pakistan’s official response and give whatever information they seek — to the extent that we deem it appropriate — but simultaneously insist that Pakistan respond positively to India’s objectives which were conveyed to it in January this year.
The United States is a very important interlocutor and it has a number of leverages over Pakistan which India does not have. As regards the rest of the international community, China is a swing state in many ways but Beijing has its own interests in relation to Pakistan that do not necessarily correspond to India’s.
Army GHQ-civilian government relations in Pakistan is a complex contestation which has a genesis of 60 years since the independence of Pakistan. India should be sensitive to the turbulence in that country and if India’s long-term objective is to ensure that the Pakistan Army goes back to the barracks and a civilian government assumes credible political power as it ought to, any hasty action by India that degrades this long-term objective would be imprudent.
India’s compulsions in an election year are predictable but there is a strong case for not playing to the gallery and making Pakistan an emotive issue, notwithstanding the enormity of Mumbai. Major political parties have a special responsibility in how they package their campaign discourses.
The threat posed by the Taliban is very real and very intense and we in India should be cognisant of its virulence and the determination of its leadership. The more recent instance of many girls schools being destroyed in Swat valley and forcing the government of Pakistan to come to accept the imposition of Sharia law is illustrative.
We still do not have the kind of composite national capacity that is required to preempt and prevent another Mumbai. Episodic reactivism that lapses into systemic stasis is a deeply-embedded national characteristic that we have to overcome. A good example is the suggestion that since defence expenditure has increased by about Rs 25,000 crore this year this would ensure that another Mumbai does not occur. There could not be a bigger red herring. Fiscal allocation does not translate into military capacity automatically. Returning unspent money from the capital account of the defence budget to the national exchequer is inexplicable when block obsolescence is the leitmotif of the Indian military’s existing inventory.
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India must keep all options open
Alok Bansal
One must understand that Pakistan’s recent response to the Indian dossier, wherein it accepted the involvement of Pakistani citizens and organisations in the Mumbai terrorist attacks, was consequent to the visit of Richard Holbrooke to Islamabad, and more than seven weeks after the dossier was handed over to Pakistani authorities.
Prime facie Pakistan has taken some steps, which include registering an FIR and accepting that a part of the planning for the Mumbai attacks had taken place in Pakistan. This may be taken as a belated acceptance of its complicity, but it could as well be a tactic to buy time. India cannot let up diplomatic pressure until Pakistan delivers.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Therefore India must ensure that the perpetrators of the Mumbai outrage are punished, terrorist camps closed, and terror infrastructure permanently dismantled. Mere filing of an FIR yields nothing. As a first step, Indian officials must be provided access to interrogate Lakhvi and others in Pakistani custody. Pakistan’s response since November 26, 2008 has been to make concessions and then back away. Every time there was international pressure, they yielded. But as soon as pressure is withdrawn, they become intransigent.
Today Pakistan is in a state of flux, there is a power struggle going on between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, as well as between the two major political parties, the PPP and PML(N). Post-26/11, the Pakistan Army has succeeded in redeeming itself from the stigma of the Musharraf years and has become a major player again. The manner in which the attacks in Mumbai were executed indicates a high level of military understanding, and the involvement of serving or retired military officers is a distinct possibility.
Recent peace deals with the Taliban in Swat valley clearly indicate the willingness of a section of Pakistani establishment to cohabit with the Islamist radicals. The Pakistani security establishment for long has been using these Islamist radical groups to further their perceived strategic goals in Afghanistan and India, especially in J&K. Any accommodation of Taliban or groups associated with them poses a significant threat to India.
India cannot afford to act under the belief that Pakistan will act in good faith. Pakistan’s response to the Indian dossier can at best be described as half-hearted, and until Pakistan delivers India should keep all her options open. However, economic cooperation and people-to-people contacts must continue as they can provide long-term leverages to India. (AA)
FEB.19 : India’s most viable diplomatic options now would be to maintain the current posture vis-a-vis Pakistan, while simultaneously trying to prevail upon the international community to encourage Islamabad to respond to India in a positive way. Any attempt to intimidate and disparage Pakistan in public would be counter-productive.
We should accept Pakistan’s official response and give whatever information they seek — to the extent that we deem it appropriate — but simultaneously insist that Pakistan respond positively to India’s objectives which were conveyed to it in January this year.
The United States is a very important interlocutor and it has a number of leverages over Pakistan which India does not have. As regards the rest of the international community, China is a swing state in many ways but Beijing has its own interests in relation to Pakistan that do not necessarily correspond to India’s.
Army GHQ-civilian government relations in Pakistan is a complex contestation which has a genesis of 60 years since the independence of Pakistan. India should be sensitive to the turbulence in that country and if India’s long-term objective is to ensure that the Pakistan Army goes back to the barracks and a civilian government assumes credible political power as it ought to, any hasty action by India that degrades this long-term objective would be imprudent.
India’s compulsions in an election year are predictable but there is a strong case for not playing to the gallery and making Pakistan an emotive issue, notwithstanding the enormity of Mumbai. Major political parties have a special responsibility in how they package their campaign discourses.
The threat posed by the Taliban is very real and very intense and we in India should be cognisant of its virulence and the determination of its leadership. The more recent instance of many girls schools being destroyed in Swat valley and forcing the government of Pakistan to come to accept the imposition of Sharia law is illustrative.
We still do not have the kind of composite national capacity that is required to preempt and prevent another Mumbai. Episodic reactivism that lapses into systemic stasis is a deeply-embedded national characteristic that we have to overcome. A good example is the suggestion that since defence expenditure has increased by about Rs 25,000 crore this year this would ensure that another Mumbai does not occur. There could not be a bigger red herring. Fiscal allocation does not translate into military capacity automatically. Returning unspent money from the capital account of the defence budget to the national exchequer is inexplicable when block obsolescence is the leitmotif of the Indian military’s existing inventory.
***
India must keep all options open
Alok Bansal
One must understand that Pakistan’s recent response to the Indian dossier, wherein it accepted the involvement of Pakistani citizens and organisations in the Mumbai terrorist attacks, was consequent to the visit of Richard Holbrooke to Islamabad, and more than seven weeks after the dossier was handed over to Pakistani authorities.
Prime facie Pakistan has taken some steps, which include registering an FIR and accepting that a part of the planning for the Mumbai attacks had taken place in Pakistan. This may be taken as a belated acceptance of its complicity, but it could as well be a tactic to buy time. India cannot let up diplomatic pressure until Pakistan delivers.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Therefore India must ensure that the perpetrators of the Mumbai outrage are punished, terrorist camps closed, and terror infrastructure permanently dismantled. Mere filing of an FIR yields nothing. As a first step, Indian officials must be provided access to interrogate Lakhvi and others in Pakistani custody. Pakistan’s response since November 26, 2008 has been to make concessions and then back away. Every time there was international pressure, they yielded. But as soon as pressure is withdrawn, they become intransigent.
Today Pakistan is in a state of flux, there is a power struggle going on between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, as well as between the two major political parties, the PPP and PML(N). Post-26/11, the Pakistan Army has succeeded in redeeming itself from the stigma of the Musharraf years and has become a major player again. The manner in which the attacks in Mumbai were executed indicates a high level of military understanding, and the involvement of serving or retired military officers is a distinct possibility.
Recent peace deals with the Taliban in Swat valley clearly indicate the willingness of a section of Pakistani establishment to cohabit with the Islamist radicals. The Pakistani security establishment for long has been using these Islamist radical groups to further their perceived strategic goals in Afghanistan and India, especially in J&K. Any accommodation of Taliban or groups associated with them poses a significant threat to India.
India cannot afford to act under the belief that Pakistan will act in good faith. Pakistan’s response to the Indian dossier can at best be described as half-hearted, and until Pakistan delivers India should keep all her options open. However, economic cooperation and people-to-people contacts must continue as they can provide long-term leverages to India. (AA)
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