IMPHAL, Jun 14: The self-righteousness of the NSCN(IM) in boasting about their “...magnanimity in helping out the various revolutionary groups of the region” and the assertion that “fighting with the common enemy unitedly does not necessarily mean fighting for a common goal” is a point for further debate so that concerned people can make their own judgment, a UNLF statement from Ksh Yoiheiba, senior publicity officer, has said.The UNLF’s belief in the composite interdependent unity of the Indian occupied region, has been its consistent revolutionary effort to develop fraternal relationship with all the revolutionary struggles in the region for unity against the common enemy. Believing in the fraternal interdependent coexistence of all the peoples in the region, UNLF tried to develop fraternal relationship with the Naga struggle from the time of undivided NNC, and also with the Mizo National Front, then leading the Mizo freedom struggle, the statement said. It was all in the larger interest of searching for regional unity against the common enemy. In this effort, UNLF had to swallow the disdain and condescending attitude towards ‘Manipur of having compromised its sovereignty with India’ not knowing fully well the history of forcible annexation of Manipur by India in 1949, it said.On the other hand, UNLF was surprised, rather disappointed, to discover later that MNF and NNC in the 1970s, even when they were receiving external help and assistance and actively fighting against the same enemy for the same goal of independence, did not even discuss common interests, it said adding that an unbiased analysis of this attitude would reveal their ethno-exclusive outlook subjectively separated from the common context. Though initially a necessary stage in asserting ethnic identities, this ethno-exclusive ideology more or less outlived its historical purpose when other struggles, that also mostly inspired by theirs, began to emerge in almost all parts of the region, it said adding that this marked the beginning of a new historical process necessitating the transformation of ethno-exclusive ideologies into inclusive revolutionary struggles so as to consciously develop revolutionary unity of the region beyond ethnic lines. Regional unity on the basis of a minimum common goal is a prerequisite condition for ‘fighting unitedly’ against the common enemy, it said while stating that this minimum common goal should be the basis for regional unity without which fighting unitedly against the common enemy is unthinkable. The question is, what should be the minimum common goal for fighting unitedly against India. For those aspiring to be free from Indian colonial occupation, the minimum common goal should logically be to overthrow Indian colonial occupation from the region. Without this common goal it is simply indulgence in absurd illusions to think about fighting unitedly. Or, if it is a deliberate policy of using, rather abusing a united front for one’s exclusive goal, then it is insincere opportunistic politics forbidden by revolutionary culture, it said.Thus, the reality of the region – the composite interdependent unity and confronting a common external enemy – demands of the various revolutionary organisations to fight united against the common enemy for a comprehensive solution. UNLF is firmly convinced that any individual effort, ignoring the reality of the region, to fight, bargain or negotiate independence with India separately, is doomed to end in failure. This has been clearly proved by fifty years of armed struggle. Therefore, it is of primary importance to build regional unity on the basis of a common understanding of the region’s historical process, putting in place ‘unique histories’ as all histories are unique in their own ways, it said.Therefore, the NSCN(IM) policy statement that “fighting with the common enemy unitedly does not necessarily mean fighting for a common goal” is self-contradictory and does not hold water in the regional context. It reflects confusion between policy and goal. Or, was NSCN(IM) using the regional united front as a bargaining factor to attain the exclusive goal of ‘Nagalim’? it asked.Whatever the goal, it is this self-confessed contradiction between policy and goal of the NSCN(IM) that is primarily responsible for the present disarray in the region’s liberation struggles and also within the NSCN(IM). By stating this, UNLF is not ‘meddling’ in NSCN(IM)’s internal affairs. Because any revolutionary organisation in the region has the right to make critical assessments of other’s policies in so far as it has negative repercussions on regional unity, it said. Had it been a correct policy based on objective reality, the NSCN(IM) would have been in a much better position than now to lead the Naga struggle. But the present sorry state of Naga struggle consequent upon the ten-year-old-no-result peace-talk between NSCN(IM) and government of India leaves nothing to be jealous about despite their claims of having “coordinating offices in different countries, including India.” No amount of external factors can act to bring about qualitative changes without creating favourable internal conditions, the UNLF said.UNLF’s official relationship with the Naga struggle began with the NNC in 1977. This relationship was further maintained with the NSCN under the collective leadership of chairman Isaak Chisi Swu, vice-chairman SS Khaplang and general secretary Th Muivah from 1980. UNLF’s relationship with the undivided NSCN was an example of fraternal revolutionary relationship. It was a reciprocal relationship, it said. UNLF was benefited by the base facilities at NSCN base area. UNLF is grateful and feels indebted to the undivided NSCN, particularly to the eastern Nagas in the NSCN base area who shared their all in providing food and shelter to UNLF. But it must be put on record that UNLF did not solicit arms or military training from the NSCN as many would have thought. UNLF imparted military training to its cadres and procured arms and ammunition with own resources, it said. Today, UNLF feels proud of its self achievement when NSCN(IM) boasts of its ‘magnanimity to UNLF’. On its part, UNLF contributed all it can for the development of the base area. UNLF transported and installed a printing press in the NSCN base area, the first in the history of the region’s revolutionary struggle. UNLF also contributed physically in introducing wet rice cultivation. Besides, UNLF provided human resource in running schools and medical centers. From the UNLF presence, NSCN was benefited in many ways. Besides, UNLF provided help and support to NSCN in many operations. When the NSCN was split in 1989, UNLF continued the relationship with the one led by chairman Khaplang who was in control of the NSCN headquarters.The undivided NSCN earned respect and confidence when its leadership provided the correct revolutionary line and saved the Naga struggle from capitulation of the Shillong Accord. This was an inspiration to other revolutionary organisations in the Region. It was natural that the Region expected leadership from the NSCN in the struggle against India. However, some leaders of the NSCN failed to understand the more important historical role they were supposed to shoulder when they began parleys through go-betweens with government of India in 1984, it said. To the NSCN(IM) “fighting with the common enemy unitedly does not necessarily mean fighting for a common goal.” The NSCN(IM) also wants to protect the ‘uniqueness of Naga history’ by not making a joint issue with those who have joined forces with the enemies…” This must be the policy that prompted the NSCN(IM) to abandon the South East Himalayan Self Defence United Front, hardly before fighting unitedly began, when they singed the ceasefire agreement with India in 1997 to begin ‘peace talk’. Is this an example of revolutionary sincerity?the UNLF asked.UNLF would remind NSCN(IM) that whatever has been said against them is not hate campaign, nor is it out of enmity. It was certain policies of the NSCN(IM) against which any revolutionary organisation was morally obliged to speak out. Such as, the policy of ethnic cleansing against the Kukis and the united front policy against India. So far as the situation in Manipur is concerned NSCN(IM) needs to be more accurate. It is true that a couple of valley villages in Manipur have demanded weapons, but not against UNLF as stated by NSCN(IM). It was for self protection against armed gangs and from the unwarranted actions of some particular organisations. As for public relations, right now UNLF enjoys general sympathy and support because of its pro-people policies and actions.All said and done, UNLF suggest a dispassionate review of all the struggles in the region so as to seek common grounds and narrow down differences in the spirit of revolutionary unity against the common enemy, the statement said.
(Courtesy:IFP)
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